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Abstract 
This article illuminates how, since 9/11, security policy has gradually become more central to 
a range of resilience discourses and practices. As this process draws a wider range of security 
infrastructures, organizations and approaches into the enactment of resilience, security 
practices are enabled through more palatable and legitimizing discourses of resilience. This 
article charts the emergence and proliferation of security-driven resilience logics, deployed at 
different spatial scales, which exist in tension with each other. We exemplify such tensions in 
practice through a detailed case study from Birmingham, UK: ‘Project Champion’ an attempt 
to install over 200 high-resolution surveillance cameras, often invisibly, around 
neighbourhoods with a predominantly Muslim population. Here, practices of security-driven 
resilience came into conflict with other policy priorities focused upon community-centred 
social cohesion, posing a series of questions about social control, surveillance and the ability 
of national agencies to construct community resilience in local areas amidst state attempts to 
label the same spaces as ‘dangerous’. It is argued that security-driven logics of resilience 
generate conflicts in how resilience is operationalized, and produce and reproduce new 
hierarchical arrangements which, in turn, may work to subvert some of the founding 
aspirations and principles of resilience logic itself. 
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Constructing resilience through security and surveillance: The politics, practices and tensions of 
security-driven resilience  
 
Introduction  
Since the early 2000s, the so-called ‘resilience turn’ (Coaffee, 2013) has seen ideas, 
discourses and logics of resilience embedded in an array of social and urban policy and 
practice at a range of spatial scales, driven by an overarching requirement to secure the 
future from disruptive challenges, threats and events (Coaffee, 2010; Walker and Cooper, 
2011). The rhetoric of resilience has now permeated a range of disparate disciplinary areas, a 
diversity of policy narratives, worlds of professional practice and the popular media. The 
resilience literature has focused on, for example, cli- mate change adaption, disaster risk 
recovery, economic recovery, migratory trends, individual and group psychology, child 
education or, more broadly, a general sense of uncertainty about the future (see, for 
example, Luthar et al., 2000; Masten, 2001; Raco and Street, 2012). However, this article 
argues that these diverse meanings and practices of security have become the most potent 
driver and shaper of contemporary resilience practices. In turn, these have served to 
generate multiple competing ‘logics of resilience’ identified and explored in this article. 
Conversely, this article pro- poses the concept of ‘security-driven resilience’ to capture multi-
directional processes in which resilience policy becomes increasingly driven by security 
concerns and, at the same time, security policy adopts the language of resilience. As this 
article will demonstrate, such processes present a range of implications, including the 
narrowing of formerly diverse resilience concerns towards very specific forms of security and, 
at the same time, generating multiple governmental, scaling and coercive implications.  
This article is situated within the anticipatory turn in social control practices (Fussey, 2013) 
and at the intersection of concepts of security and resilience. Particular emphasis is also 
placed on how collapsing distinctions between internal and external security draws multiple 
new actors and agencies into the delivery of security-driven resilience. To conceptualize and 
chart the emergence of what we term security-driven resilience we have referred to a range 
of emergent literatures from surveillance studies; the revolution in military affairs; human 
security; and state-rescaling and emerging narratives of new localism and resilient 
citizenship. In turn, these have collectively sought to pull security away from its traditional 
bias and to focus upon the everyday needs of people and population (Coaffee and Murakami-
Wood, 2006; Chandler, 2012). Using this conceptual framing, this article is developed with 
regard to two main areas of analysis.  
First, we highlight resilience as an evolving and ongoing process and chart the emergence 
and embedding of new security logics within resilience policy and practice at multiple scales: 
on one hand, developing an array of national policy guidance and strategies; while, on the 
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other, ostensibly decentralizing power and responsibility to the local scale, inverting 
traditional security logics based on state level control. Such devolutionary processes generate 
questions about the localization of security-driven resilience practice, the importation of 
existing scales to the local level and the generation of new hierarchies within emergent 
networks of practice. Here, the practices and application of public surveillance programmes 
are characterized as an exemplification of the weighting of resilience practices towards 
security concerns, yet are seen to perform a range of more benign functions. In doing so, the 
second part of the article explores how tensions brought about through such rescaling and 
reconceptualization of security-led resilience are embodied in practice, by means of a 
detailed case study example from Birmingham, UK. This case study focuses upon ‘Project 
Champion’ – an attempt by the police to install over 200 high-resolution surveillance 
cameras, often invisibly, into areas with predominantly Muslim populations, ostensibly to 
deliver a range of security and resilience benefits including protection from crime, 
radicalization and inter- national terrorism. This case study captures how the practices of 
state-driven security and resilience are drawn into conflict with other policy priorities relating 
specifically to community cohesion and localism. It also captures a process by which military 
technologies have been increasingly utilized in civic spaces, posing a series of questions about 
social control, citizenship and the ability to construct community resilience in local areas 
amidst state attempts to label the same areas as ‘dangerous’. We conclude by reflecting 
upon how new logics, hierarchies and practices of security-driven resilience generate a range 
of tensions and antagonisms which, in turn, produce a number of material and political 
consequences which serve to fragment further coalitions of resilience practice and may 
ultimately subvert some of the founding principles of resilience. The article thus examines the 
complex interplays between three main themes: resilience, security and surveillance. The 
central argument rests on how proliferating resilience practices are increasingly weighted 
towards security concerns and that public surveillance operations may be seen as an 
exemplar and reveal a range of corollaries, consequences and tensions of this shift. In 
particular, the article focuses on how the deployment of public surveillance initiatives, as part 
of the broader process of security-driven resilience, both narrows their application towards 
very specific coercive forms whilst simultaneously commuting more broadly conceived 
resilience practice towards tightly specified security-focused goals. Before exploring these 
interrelationships and logics in more detail, the article first explores the meaning and 
evolution of the key operational concepts of resilience, security and surveillance.  
The ‘resilience turn’, scales of security and the practice of surveillance  
In recent years the emergence, evolution and growth of resilience discourse and practice has 
become well documented (see, for example, Chandler 2014) and does not necessarily benefit 
from a detailed rehearsal here. The concept of resilience incorporates a vast range of 
contemporary risks and security challenges (UNISDR, 2012; Walker and Broderick, 2006; Zolli 
and Healy, 2012) and, after 9/11, has increasingly become a central organizing metaphor 
within the expanding multi- scalar institutional framework of national security and 
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emergency preparedness (Adey and Anderson, 2012; Joseph, 2013).  
Over time, the lexicon of resilience has grown in international prominence with a focus on 
resilience practices seen as simultaneously proactive and reactive, with in-built adaptability 
to the fluid nature of myriad threats and hazards challenging states and their territories. 
Resilience has thus been applied to the capacity to resist, absorb, recover from and adapt to 
a range of perturbations. Thus, the spread of resilience discourse (see, for example, Coaffee, 
2009) has intimated the simultaneous response to ‘all hazards’ in which numerous threats 
and hazards, both “natural” and human induced, are drawn together’ (Dainty and Bosher, 
2008).  
However, the growing canon of critical resilience scholarship has generated a number of core 
debates that serve as critical contexts for this present article. First among these concerns is 
the futility of searching for a homogenous definition of resilience. For all the recourse to 
resilience ur-texts – such as the work of Holling (1973; 2001) – or conceptual staples such as 
subsidiarity, redundancy and adaptability, the growing acknowledgement that ideological, 
institutional, cultural, social and normative considerations shape how resilience is mobilized 
in different organizational, social and spatial settings is particularly noteworthy. It could 
instead be contended that focus is better placed on how resilience is enacted, and what its 
performative roles and implications are. Thus, what resilience is becomes less important than 
what it does. Increasingly common within this approach is to see resilience in relation to 
varied forms of neoliberal governance (O’Malley, 2010), such as its role in fomenting 
decentralizing forms of governance (Amin, 2013) or championing of utilitarian neoliberal 
citizenship (Neocleous, 2013: 5). A corollary of this concerns the manifold and localized ways 
in which resilience becomes interpreted and translated into practice. Here, further relevant 
debate concerns the extent to which resilience practice represents transformative or radical 
change, comprises a superficial rebranding of existing practices (such as risk management) or 
operates in the service of enduring processes such as localization, responsibilization or 
neoliberalization.  
Parallel discourses and practices of security have also followed a number of neoliberalizing, 
diversifying and decentralizing tendencies. For example, security policy in the orthodox view 
regularly embodied a spatial focus on a national or supra-national scale (Booth, 2004). Since 
the 1990s, however, emerging ideas of ‘human security’ have increasingly come to 
prominence and attempted to pull security away from its institutional bias, and focus it on 
the needs of people and populations and, in so doing, remap scale in security. This work 
coincided with a progressive reassertion of the importance of scale in political geography and 
the deployment of the ‘politics-of- scale’ metaphor (see, for example, Brenner, 2000) to 
illuminate the ways in which politics explicitly constrains scale choices and ‘to theorise the 
scalarity of sociospatial life’ (Fraser, 2010). Here, there has been a shift from traditional 
Euclidian, Cartesian and Westphalian notions of scale and territory as a fixed stable bounded 
container to notions of scalar practices where governance and institutional frameworks are 
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utilized largely, but not exclusively, by the state, to gain competitive advantage and to engage 
in new networked relations through rescaling (Fraser, 2010: 332).  
Although driven by developments such as globalization and devolution, the politics of scale 
has strong resonance with the emerging and fluid geo-political landscape of security. For 
example, responses to a range of international terrorist attacks, since 9/11 in particular, have 
increasingly highlighted the importance of sub-national and localized responses to new 
security challenges, which require analysis through a different frame of reference than that 
of the realist state-centric security studies orthodoxy, ‘placing the needs of the individual, not 
states, at the centre of security discourses’ (Chandler, 2012: 214). As has been argued, 
‘security is becoming more civic, urban, domestic and personal: security is coming home’ 
(Coaffee and Murakami-Wood, 2006: 504).  
Overall, discourses and practices of resilience and of security have developed in parallel and 
heavily imbricated ways. For example, we can chart how the ideas underpinning the political 
rhetoric of resilience have also become more civic-centred and reapplied across a spectrum 
of multi-scalar socio-economic systems (Burby et al., 2000; Coaffee et al., 2008), similar to 
ideas of security outlined above. The picture is complicated further by the way that a broader 
discursive shift in policy – from security to resilience – has subsequently been used to frame 
associated practices in the post-9/11 world. This is as a consequence of the altered 
geopolitical relationship between the nation state and security – essentially constructing a 
deterritorialized view of risk – which attempts to soften the vocabulary of ‘emergencies’ and 
focus upon a more positive terminology – resilience – rather than that of threat, vulnerability, 
disaster management and security (Coaffee, 2006; 2013). Yet, for all the seeming benignity 
and diversification of focus implied in resilience discourse, we argue that notions of resilience 
have increasingly adopted and come to resemble security concerns, thus constituting the 
growth of security-driven resilience. Not only does this signify a narrowing of the 
polymorphic range of concerns implied by resilience towards those of security and, 
particularly, counter-terrorism, but it also generates a range of governmental, scaling and 
coercive implications.  
The third operational concept, surveillance, has been a continual feature of human societies 
stretching back to antiquity, embedded into ancient architectural forms and, later, exercised 
through the collection of census data for taxation and conscription. Modernity saw important 
changes in the use of surveillance, because it enabled multiple ordering and organizing 
processes, and operated as a means to make visible a series of variously imagined forms of 
urban dangerousness including disease, dissent and destitution. Surveillance practices thus 
diversified and extended beyond mere observations to become a means to make cities 
legible (Fussey and Coaffee, 2012). As the city developed it became host to a range of 
increasingly intensified surveillance practices that worked to coerce, regulate and order 
elements of urban life. The 20th century brought rapid changes in the ubiquity, potency and 
technological sophistication of surveillance practices and, as the century turned, 9/11 further 
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catalyzed these developments and shepherded in many new coercive and auto- mated 
analytical applications. Most recently, attention has turned to the enormous data harvesting 
operations of UK and US intelligence agencies sanctioned by licentiously interpreted 9/11-
related legislative enablers such as s215 of the Patriot Act (Greenwald, 2014).  
Despite the ‘serious and immediate consequences’ (Bauman et al., 2014: 122) of the 
revelations in 2013 by Edward Snowden, it is important to recall the considerable diversity, 
application and purpose of surveillance practices. Surveillance is ‘Janus faced’ (Lyon, 1994), 
implicated in care as well as coercion, inhabits many forms and performs myriad functions. In 
such contexts, and despite its scale and significance, NSA dataveillance should not be 
considered as a synecdoche for surveillance practices more generally or for all security forms 
more specifically. This article focuses on the role of one particular form, public space 
surveillance, as a tool of risk and security practice that has become deployed under the wider 
and more palatable aegis of resilience. In doing so, we argue that it both narrows the 
possibilities of surveillance applications towards the coercive and draws resilience practice 
towards more tightly specified security-focused goals.  
UK resilience and security discourse: From hybridity to colonization?  
Relationships between the imbricated realms of security and resilience are complex and 
multidirectional. In particular, security concerns have gained prominence within a range of 
articulations of resilience practice. At the same time, security practice has been increasingly 
repackaged in more palatable expressions of resilience. Prior to 2000 resilience was a term 
seldom heard in security policy circles. Whereas securing state assets against international 
terrorism had long been a government priority, this was an agenda that had been almost 
exclusively delivered by state security services. In 2000 and early 2001 a series of disruptive 
events in the UK – strategically targeted nationwide protests on the transport network; the 
foot and mouth disease outbreak; a number of inland flooding episodes – highlighted several 
organizational failings which served to emphasize that reform of national emergency 
planning procedures was long overdue. The subsequent events of 9/11, and the concern that 
key UK sites would be targeted by terrorists, accelerated this process and made reform of 
emergency preparedness a political priority. National security policy was thus increasingly 
focused on the need to respond proactively and develop pre-emptive solutions to per- ceived 
security threats. For all the emphasis on anticipation, and the language of preparedness, 
anticipation and risk it was at this juncture that the term ‘resilience’ came to the fore 
(Coaffee, 2006) and was eventually formalized in policies and practices following the 2004 
Civil Contingencies Act (CCA); for example, the associated National Resilience Capabilities 
Programme and subsequent creation of multi-agency Local Resilience Forums.1 Following the 
introduction of the CCA, the UK government attempted to provide a central strategic 
direction for developing resilience, based on a cycle of anticipation, prevention, preparation, 
response and recovery (Cabinet Office, 2005). Subsequent national security and counter-
terrorism policies – notably the overarching Countering International Terrorism Strategy 
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(CONTEST) (HM Government, 2006), the UK’s first national security strategy (Security in an 
Interdependent World [Cabinet Office, 2008]) and the initial anti-radicalization approach 
(Preventing Violent Extremism [HM Government, 2008]) –interlinked in various ways with the 
provisions of the CCA to form a powerful top-down state- driven logic for ‘resilience’ 
policy.2,3,4 Individually and collectively these policy narratives signified an increasingly 
complex and fluid landscape where multiple threats were being faced and which required 
coordinated responses across a range of scales and stakeholder groups, including local 
communities. As these responses have evolved, a number of different security-driven 
resilience logics, each encompassing complex relationships between security and resilience, 
can be identified. Here, resilience policy becomes increasingly mobilized by security concerns 
and, at the same time, security policy adopts the language of resilience. Moreover, as these 
logics develop and unroll through a range of practices, a series of incompatibilities and 
tensions within and between different thematic and scalar approaches can be seen to 
emerge.  
The UK has perhaps gone furthest in developing security-driven resilience policy since 9/11. 
This article charts the surfacing and progression of different ‘logics’ of resilience over the last 
decade with a focus on UK politics and policy making at a range of scales. Changing practices 
of resilience have emerged as both a function of time and in relation to a range of changing 
socio- political and economic pressures which have shaped an evolving meaning and 
operational function of resilience. In particular, we emphasize the prominence of security 
concerns within such articulations of resilience discourse which, as a corollary, have drawn a 
number of security practices and infrastructures, such as surveillance, into the delivery of 
resilience practice. For example, and as we will highlight, the logics underpinning UK 
resilience policy have responded to the changing targeting preferences of international 
terrorists (Coaffee, 2010) concerns over ‘radicalization’ (Briggs, 2010) as well as a renewed 
interest in localism as a means of building enhanced community resilience (Cabinet Office, 
2011a). As the discussion below relates, surveillance practices have been implicated in the 
delivery of each of these. We pay particular attention here to the tensions that have emerged 
as a result of the simultaneous adoption of security-driven resilience practice at a range of 
spatial and governance scales.  
Security-driven resilience logic 1: State driven reassurance, resistance and bouncing back  
As noted above, in advance of the CCA, and in the wake of 9/11, national government and 
municipal authorities were forced to confront a widespread fear that the UK, and especially 
its cities, would be targeted by international terrorists. This threat gave momentum to the 
birth of a range of national counter-terrorism and security strategies and the development of 
what would become specific forms of resilience policy. This prominence of such concerns led 
to the implementation of measures to counter such threats and increased emphasis on 
security couched within broadly conceived notions of resilience. These measures focused in 
particular on enhancing the physical robustness of the built environment and furthering 
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human and technological surveillance capabilities.  
This first logic of security-driven resilience was materially manifest in a number of ways. First, 
and with particular import for the focus of this article, electronic surveillance measures, 
particularly software-driven systems facilitating automated production, ordering and control 
of space and everyday life (Lyon, 2003), proliferated throughout public and semi-public 
spaces. 9/11, in particular, proved a catalytic event for the mass introduction of hi-tech 
surveillance systems – a surveillance surge – with the intensification and expansion of 
existing systems and the adoption of ever more refined tracking technologies (Ball and 
Webster, 2003). Second, security-driven resilience was enhanced through the increased 
popularity of physical or symbolic notions of the boundary and territorial enclosure, which 
served a defensive purpose, often through the erection of rein- forced security barriers, and 
of locating surveillance devices around ‘at risk’ sites, constructing hermetically sealed 
exclusion zones (Coaffee, 2004; Fussey and Coaffee, 2012). Under this logic surveillance 
applications adopt a range of coercive and enforcement-based roles.  
This first logic of security-driven resilience has been largely state controlled and implemented 
by the police and national security agencies.5 The spatiality of resilience was particularly 
manifest through highly surveilled and visible fortress-like security at high-risk sites such as 
Government buildings key financial centres and national embassies. This reaction was not 
unique to the UK: it characterized the initial international reaction to post-9/11 anxieties 
(Graham, 2004). While the need to protect key government assets within the homeland was 
necessarily reactive and obtrusive, such security assemblages also served a political purpose 
in terms of visibly demonstrating that the state was acting to protect the nation from 
terrorism (Boddy, 2007). Crucial here is the way in which these avowedly security-focused 
practices have since become articulated in terms of resilience across UK government policy, 
particularly notable in the latest iteration of the UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy (HM 
Government, 2011). Thus, according to this logic, over time the language of security has 
become recast as that of resilience without changing its fundamental focus and purpose. 
Such practices reflect a further enduring theme identified in critical analyses of resilience, in 
particular the way in which resilience planning is often translated into more narrowly 
conceived measures that seek robustness against potential hazards (Bosher and Dainty, 
2011). Such approaches are reminiscent of Holling’s (1973) critique of ‘engineering resilience’ 
orchestrated around the goal of the maintenance of stable systems which, ultimately, fail to 
be resilient in themselves.  
Security-driven resilience logic 2: Devolving, preparing and pre-empting  
While the first logic of security-driven resilience was inherently reactive and materially 
focused, and sought to mitigate security risk, as the 2000s proceeded increased effort was 
made to focus on preparedness and preventative aspects of the resilience cycle. The second 
logic thus moved beyond the ability to absorb shock, to focus instead on the ability of 
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businesses, governments and com- munities to take preventative action. National 
government stakeholders increasingly sought to cooperate with regional and local authorities 
and a range of professional stakeholders through the development of a multi-level system of 
resilience governance across national, regional and local levels in the UK in line with the 
provisions of the CCA. In many respects such resilience practices mirror broader trends in 
public governance of the past 20 years, where the ‘regulatory state’ ‘steers’ via strategy and 
the ‘rowing’ of implementation is carried out locally (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Such 
drives towards multi-level action thus may be located among a number of broader processes 
aimed at devolving central state functions and responsibility onto the local realm, including 
responsibilities for emergency planning, tackling crime and disorder and, separately, 
terrorism. Overall, this second logic fomented a shift in the governance as well as the focus of 
resilience. In particular, this process enabled security concerns to become further 
consolidated as the central concern of resilience practice whilst national security became 
played out in the local realm under the aegis of resilience and community-building.  
Here, actions of local governments became central in developing tailored resilience strategies 
against a range of risks; but most prominent among these was terrorism (Walker and 
Broderick, 2006), again underscoring the central role of security in more broadly conceived 
notions of resilience. Security-driven resilience has thus been enacted through the increasing 
sophistication and cost of security and contingency planning undertaken by organizations and 
different levels of government, intended to decrease their vulnerability and increase 
preparedness in the event of an attack. Most organizations have reviewed and re-evaluated 
their individual risk assessment approaches and local authorities have sought to become 
more resilient and create more effective, joined-up approaches to the governance of disaster 
recovery with the institutional management of any future terrorist attack given the highest 
priority (Coaffee, 2006; Adey and Anderson, 2012). Thus, resilience practices further 
coalesced around notions of security.  
Notwithstanding the multi-scalar governance established to coordinate resilience practice, 
the ambient threat of urban terrorist attack and its realization in London on ‘7/7’ defines the 
second logic of security-driven resilience.6 Signifying a further collapse of distinctions 
between internal and external security, concerns over ‘home grown terrorists’ focused 
government attention on the so called ‘Prevent’ strand of national counter-terrorism policy 
concerned with ‘the radicalization of individuals’. This became a controversial area of policy, 
especially with regard to the emotive language often used to describe it (for example terms 
such as radicals, extremists, etc.), and accusations of discrimination against particular racial 
or ethnic groups (Kaplan, 2006; Poynting and Mason, 2007). In a similar way to the UK, other 
countries have also adopted what Aly (2013) refers to as a ‘softer approach’ to counter-
terrorism – Australia’s ‘Resilience’ approach and the US ‘Diminish’ being widely cited 
examples. In counter-distinction to the protective and state-led responses to 9/11, after 7/7 
there was a refocusing on localized community-based approaches towards counter-terrorism 
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in the UK with ... the government acknowledging the need to work in partnership with 
Muslim communities to prevent young people from being radicalised in the first place and to 
ensure that communities were resilient enough to respond to, and challenge, extremists 
from within. (Briggs, 2010: 971)  
The co-option of community-level groups into the provision of security-driven resilience 
practices has been controversial, however, amid accusations that such attempts represented 
a Trojan Horse for coercive state control to become intensified in local contexts (Kundnani, 
2009). In the wake of 7/7 the UK Government immediately set up the Preventing Extremism 
Together (PET) Taskforce in August 2005 to underpin this locally-focused effort and 
eventually this fed into enhanced funding with delivery being coordinated by local police 
forces and local government in conjunction with community organizations. Overall, Prevent – 
and the series of specific policies that flowed from it – was seen as a longer-term objective 
where the state and its agencies attempted to tackle the root causes of extremism in a pre-
emptive, proactive and community-focused way.7 In the UK, resilience discourses have 
become further implicated in combating violent extremism programmes via the language of 
individual resilience to radicalization (Home Office, 2011). In sum, as security has become the 
prominent feature of resilience practice, security assets are justified as providing resilience 
whilst discourses and resources of resilience are deployed to enhance security.  
Mirroring the anticipatory turn in social control practices more broadly (Fussey, 2013), the 
prominence of this security-driven resilience logic has served to direct the use of specific 
surveillance and security practices towards pre-emptive and amelioratory ends. Here, for 
example, cam- era surveillance has been located within broader postmodern forms of 
penality based on the management and redistribution of risks (Norris and McCahill, 2006), 
rather than aspiring to modernist forms of re-normalizing or rehabilitating transgressors. In 
such circumstances, social control is no longer ‘social’. At the same time, such practices have 
been accompanied by accelerated diversification in the governance of public surveillance 
(Fussey, 2008). Here, responsibility for providing surveillance strategies that meet local 
concerns, as well as protecting against state- focused transgressions such as terrorism, is 
devolved ‘down’ to lower levels of the state and non- state actors. However, the central state 
retains at the same time its ‘trump card’ status, potentially overriding local concerns, liberties 
and rights in areas it defines as the higher national interest. Such composite ensembles of 
security-driven resilience practice draw a range of competing frames and responsibilities 
together, generating tensions and collisions elucidated in the empirical case study below. In 
doing so, the delivery of security-driven resilience animates a particularly important two-part 
question, long established in critical security studies but only recently gaining prominence in 
counterpart critiques of resilience: ‘what is being made resilience, and for whom?’.  
Security-driven resilience logic 3: Towards local and everyday practice  
Whereas the first two logics of security-driven resilience have been largely advanced by the 
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state and prescribed through a range of resilience-related national strategies, over time a 
new logic began to emerge where there was a need for security to be balanced with other 
material and socio- economic considerations, and for increased responsibility to be devolved 
to a range of local scales and non-governmental stakeholders to achieve this end. Under this 
logic, businesses, governments and communities increasingly sought to anticipate shocks 
and, ultimately, to embed resilience in everyday activities and professional practice.  
This third evolving logic of security-driven resilience also had a distinctive communitarian 
twist in contrast to the traditional ‘command and control’ approach of central government. 
Increasingly, however, the focus of resilience policy has been directed toward smaller spatial 
scales and everyday activities, which ‘is premised on institutions and organisations letting go, 
[and] creating the necessary framework for action’ (Edwards, 2009: 80, italics in original). 
Here, resilience is ‘coming home’ and practices become nested locally, providing a fit with 
wider UK Government ambitions to create a new, more community-driven social contract 
between citizens and the state. In the UK principles of resilience are now also critical with 
regard to the current drive towards enhanced localism (HM Government, 2010) – a policy 
dynamic that places emphasis on grass- roots activities and stresses the importance of 
anticipatory, holistic and comprehensive approaches to the changing nature of places. Thus, 
localized resilience approaches become realized not through state institutions, but upon 
localized networked responses, with governance dispersed more widely across key 
stakeholders and sectors. Enhanced citizen resilience is, however, still articulated through the 
lens of emergency planning, in the belief that greater resilience will be produced by 
‘communities and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in 
an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services’ (Cabinet 
Office, 2011b: 4).  
Similar to the preceding two logics, security-focused initiatives have been central to driving 
forward this logic of resilience. For example, in March 2010 the UK Government released a 
set of further guidance documents for built environment professionals concerned with 
enhancing built-in resilience in urban areas. These documents reinforced the message that 
the threat from terrorist attack was real and imminent, and that in line with the strategic 
framework – Working Together to Protect Crowded Places – a range of key partners including 
local government, the police, businesses and built environment professionals should work 
holistically to reduce the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorism (HM Government, 
2010). This highlighted the emergence of a much more proactive, flexible, reflexive and 
integrated approach to resilience in urban areas. In other respects, a number of police 
counter-terrorism training schemes, and also public information campaigns, have placed 
considerable emphasis on encouraging diverse security professionals and the general public 
to take ownership of, and act upon, feelings of suspicion. Most visibly, untargeted high-
profile publicity campaigns such as the Metropolitan Police’s ‘If you suspect it, report it’ and 
Transport for London’s ‘It’s all up to us’ and ‘If anything suspicious catches your eye’ 
campaigns. More targeted and formalized measures include government-funded training of 
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security professionals and other public-facing staff working in crowded places (such as 
shopping malls, stadia and hospitality) in a range of security aspects, including identifying and 
managing suspicious behaviour and materials (see Malcolm, 2013). As the discussion below 
illustrates, such processes agitate tensions within the politics of scale as a range of non-state 
stakeholders and individuals have been increasingly drawn into the delivery of security policy 
through a process of ‘responsibilization’ (Garland, 1996). Thus the governance of resilience, 
and particularly the interactions between citizen and state progressively place the onus for 
preventing and preparing for disruptive challenge onto institutions, professions, communities 
and individuals, rather than the state, the traditional provider of citizens’ security needs 
(Coaffee et al., 2008). Propelled by the processes and practices generated by these three 
dimensions of the securitization of resilience, a far more pervasive and widespread 
responsibilization of citizens may be highlighted than was previously acknowledged in much 
security research (see, for example, Dean, 1999).  
In sum, as resilience discourse and practice has proliferated over the past decade, the 
emergence of three distinct resilience logics can be identified. Within each is a clear 
gravitation towards the priorities of security and counter-terrorism, which, in turn, draw 
security infrastructures, organizations and practices into the delivery of resilience. With 
regard to the specific focus of this article, one such form of security practice, technological 
surveillance, is prominent within all three logics by way of its deployment to intensify the 
robustness of systems and infrastructure against shocks, as a tool of anticipatory control, and 
through its deployment across diverse localized settings. Adding further complexity to the 
interrelationships between security and resilience is the way security practices have become 
cloaked in the softer and more palatable language of resilience, thus enabling their non-
coercive applications to be foregrounded. With regard to technological surveillance, for 
example, as the UK government CCTV strategy states, cameras must be ‘fit for several 
purposes’ (Home Office, 2007: 13) and are implicated in a range of non-coercive roles such as 
encouraging the use of public spaces, building a sense of safety, coordinating emergency 
services in an incident, and maintaining transport infrastructure flows.  
Project Champion: Security-driven resilience in practice  
As highlighted above, as the state’s approach to security-driven resilience has evolved, so 
different logics have emerged which shape how resilience is put into practice across varied 
spatial scales. In part the ambiguity surrounding the rhetorics of security-driven resilience has 
proved problematic. As many have highlighted (Brand and Jax, 2007; Coaffee, 2006; Walker 
and Cooper, 2011) resilience is a dynamic term simultaneously applied at different scales and 
with different meanings. The scalar practices of resilience are thus complicated and fluid and 
it is therefore not surprising that as it has grown in scope and usage ‘resilience’ has 
necessarily harboured internal tensions and contradictions, as it shifted from a narrative of 
national protection to one of localized prevention and self-organizing responses. For 
example, for state actors, resilience is predominantly conceived as protection from terrorism, 
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while for the community it involves grass-roots activism and collective efficacy against threats 
(including the state’s desire to monitor them). As these diverse approaches and 
understandings of resilience become operationalized, their discordances become visible. It is 
these internal tensions that we will unpack through the following case study from 
Birmingham, UK.  
In June 2010 the media reported on a security project to install 290 surveillance cameras in 
Birmingham. Given the normalization of surveillance practices within the UK, at first glance 
many aspects of this initiative were not particularly novel. What was exceptional about the 
adoption of such practices in this instance, however, was the scale, technological 
sophistication and location of the operation. Of the high-specification surveillance cameras in 
‘Project Champion’, 150 came equipped with Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) 
capability, developed from former military technology that could automatically monitor all 
vehicles entering and exiting the areas; whilst a further 72 covert cameras were camouflaged 
within street signs, furniture and other features of the urban landscape. Most controversially, 
the cameras encircled two predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods of the city, thus 
articulating elements of the first security-driven logic of resilience outlined above: the use of 
borders, perimeters and architectures of surveillance. Here, however – with encirclement 
achieved through technological rather than physical perimeters, and the replacement of 
defended and valuable intramural spaces with those of containment and crude categorical 
suspicion – a number of variations on the theme can be observed. The subsequent media 
storm and local community outcry served to exemplify the tension existing in various 
security-driven logics of resilience with regard to core ideas of protection, prevention, 
anticipation and localism. In addition, the impact and fallout from Project Champion 
illustrates the convergence of the three logics of security-driven resilience and how their 
simultaneous pursuit generates inevitable conflicts and collisions, with one particular fault 
line converging on the divisive nature of the scheme and attempts by the local state to 
engage the community in security and crime reduction initiatives. The rise and fall of the 
project also served to illuminate tensions associated with security-driven resilience; civil 
liberties and the limits of public acceptability; the material visibility of security infrastructure; 
the modulation of different scales of resilience and how a range of different actors become 
involved in resilience governance; and, the labelling of ‘dangerous’ (and disadvantaged) 
populations through anticipatory means.  
This section draws on empirical research conducted with security and policing professionals 
since 2009. Sustained relationships with key gatekeepers enabled access to a number of 
formerly closed research environments including counter-terrorism training schemes, 
briefings, practitioner conferences and community engagement programmes. Documents 
were both provided by Birmingham City Council and sourced from police and local authority 
reviews of the scheme. Funding plans were obtained using Freedom of Information requests. 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from central government and a range of 
policing agencies. These included participants from the West Midlands Police Authority 
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(WMPA), the regional policing body that drove the implementation of the scheme; the Safer 
Birmingham Partnership (SBP), the local municipal organization responsible for community 
safety in the area; local CCTV managers; and the National Police Improvement Agency (then 
responsible for developing and delivering the national CCTV Strategy for England and Wales 
(Home Office, 2007)).  
In the UK, counter-terrorism operations have largely concentrated on a small number of 
high- density urban areas. As a corollary, entire security architectures became installed in 
highly specified areas, the focus spilling over from intended subjects and resting categorically 
on associates, networks and geographies. Geographical suspicion was a key driver for the 
inception and intended installation of Project Champion. The scheme was originally 
conceived after the (narrowly) failed London nightclub and Glasgow airport bombings of 
2007, with the siting of cameras determined by the location of several prior high profile 
terrorist plots originating from specific parts of Birmingham (verbal interview with police 
officer with responsibilities for CT in the region, unpublished). These included the first 
attempted UK-based al Qaeda plot (during 2000), the arrest of a suspected Taliban 
‘commander’ and, perhaps most famously, ‘Operation Gamble’, a plot to kidnap and 
dismember Muslim soldiers serving in the British Army, resulting in five convictions and 
leading law enforcement professionals to apply ecological perceptions of dangerousness to 
specific parts of the city (verbal interview with police officer with responsibilities for CT in the 
region, unpublished). These perceptions converged on Sparkbrook and Washwood Heath, 
two residential areas with high Muslim populations and home to 11 people convicted for 
terrorist-related activity between 2007 and 2011. These became the neighbourhoods 
encircled by the 290 Project Champion cameras.  
Sparkbrook and Washwood heath are inner-city neighbourhoods with similar population sizes 
of just over 30,000 people each. Other shared characteristics include high levels of ethnic 
diversity, and of unemployment and other socio-economic disadvantage. For example, no 
more than 10.4% of the population of either Sparkbrook or Washwood Heath are classed as 
white British, in contrast to the significantly higher levels in England (79.8%) and Birmingham 
(52.1%) (Birmingham City Council, 2011; Office of National Statistics, 2011). Moreover, both 
neighbourhoods have large concentrations of ‘suspect populations’ subjected to other forms 
of law enforcement attention (Kundnani, 2009). Forty-two per cent of Sparkbrook’s 
population identifies itself as Asian/Asian British Pakistani, with 10% self-identifying as ‘Arab’, 
with significant numbers of Somalis also residing there (Office of National Statistics, 2011). 
Washwood Heath’s population has a higher Asian/Asian British Pakistani population (57%) 
with significant numbers (5%) of residents identifying themselves as Bangladeshi and 
Kashmiri (as distinct from either Indian or Pakistani) (Office of National Statistics, 2011). Also 
notable are the high levels of socio-economic disadvantage, with more than 40% of 
households having no adults in employment in each area (Office of National Statistics, 2011). 
Beyond describing the demographic com- position of each area, such statistics have 
important consequences for the way official agencies seek to engage with residents, how 
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variants of security-driven resilience are applied, and how they are received, responded to 
and resisted by communities.  
In particular, such groups harbour classic characteristics of what UK local authorities have 
(potentially perniciously) called ‘hard-to-reach groups’. Amongst others, these two 
neighbourhoods, also provided the sites for a range of investments targeted at regeneration 
and ‘community- building’, including the engagement of residents in expressing and setting 
priorities for crime reduction (interview with local authority communities manager, 2010), 
activities analogous with the development of ‘community resilience’ outlined above. Thus, in 
this setting the third logic of security-driven resilience engages the same communities that 
are targeted by the first.  
In March 2008 WMP received £3 million funding to deploy over 200 cameras, many of which 
were ANPR enabled (ACPO [TAM], 2007). Birmingham City Council also agreed to invest 
£500,000 to assist WMP with running the scheme (Isakjee and Allen, 2013: 7). Such a ‘ring of 
steel’ vehicle monitoring approach is by no means unique to the UK, having been used in the 
financial zones of the City of London since the early 1990s (Coaffee, 2003), but the 
importation of such strategies into a residential area and the enactment of categorical 
suspicion on such as scale was novel.  
From its inception, Project Champion was intended to institute both obtrusive and 
unobtrusive monitoring regimes in which ‘suspicious’ subjects were tracked and monitored 
‘from a distance’, ensuring the safety of police officers and allowing recordings to take place 
unhindered (Fussey, 2013). Such ambitions to ‘police from afar’ contrast with the public 
participatory and community engagement remits of Birmingham’s municipal crime reduction 
body (the SBP, also responsible for managing the city’s surveillance cameras on a day-to-day 
basis), and thus illustrate tensions between different agencies, using the same technologies 
but with different aims and protocols and thus occupying different positions in the 
governance of social control. In doing so, it reveals inherent antagonisms between the 
different logics of security-driven resilience as they are applied in practice. Here, particular 
tensions exist between the first and the third logics whereby national security agendas 
become nested within, and abrade with, local community safety concerns and practices.  
Related to this, Project Champion also revealed fundamental questions regarding visibility 
and transparency in processes of security-driven resilience. We need here to gain a greater 
appreciation of the impact of both visible and invisible security measures: how such 
apparatuses ‘transmit’ symbolic messages, as well as the variety of ways in which security 
might be ‘received’ by its subjects. As Andersen and Möller (2013: 203) emphasize, this 
knowledge ‘facilitates understanding of the extent to which current societies are penetrated 
by the ideas and practices of security and surveillance, and furthers investigation of the 
discursive structures that enable such penetration’. The Project Champion scheme, both 
materially and in terms of transparent governance, highlights the opacity of many security-
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driven resilience initiatives. The active concealment of hi-tech cameras, although never 
activated, symbolically (at least in the eyes of local communities) represented an attempt to 
introduce espionage-style techniques into the neighbourhood. A key issue here is that whilst 
the placement and function of overt security measures can be actively contested, those that 
are more unobtrusive tend to be implemented without reproach. Thus, while ‘invisible’ 
security may be beneficial from a security and surveillance perspective it also brings a range 
of challenges regarding who makes decisions and how decision makers and processes are 
monitored. In other words, as Coaffee et al. (2009: 506) noted, ‘invisible forms of security 
may risk becoming an uncontested element of political and public policy’. Moreover, as 
shown in Project Champion, the concealment of the purpose of security-driven resilience can 
have major implications for trust between citizens and police at a time when community 
resilience is expanding in scope and importance within national security policy with these two 
groups mutually reliant on each other for the delivery of security and resilience.  
From the perspective of Birmingham City Council, Project Champion later became viewed 
negatively as it emerged that counter-terrorism concerns were ‘hitch-hiking’ on the 
community safety agenda in order to seek justification and legitimation for more 
controversial proposals. For example, it was reported that the SBP, asserted that, at the first 
meeting between the police and the SBP/local authority, the police never advised that the 
scheme was a counter-terrorism operation (Birmingham City Council, 2010: 28). Members of 
the WMPA present at the same meeting claimed the opposite: that there had been ‘no 
confusion that the principle and exclusive objectives of the Project were driven by the 
counter-terrorism risk’ (Birmingham City Council, 2010). There is evidence to suggest that the 
police certainly made judicious use of the ‘crime’ issue, as part of a broader ‘drip feed’ of 
information from the police to the local authority (senior SBP member, unpublished interview 
October, 2010) and thus viewed their relationship with SBP in instrumental terms. Several 
other factors support this version of events, highlighting how WMPA effectively rationalized 
Project Champion post hoc as a solution to high crime areas as a more expedient, politically 
acceptable and legitimate guise to introduce a more controversial strategy (Thames Valley 
Police, 2010: 16) rather than the inherently negative and politically unacceptable labelling of 
geographical areas as ‘hotbeds’ of radicalization. Critical tensions thus emerge between the 
first and second logics of security-driven resilience. Central and local state responses clash 
through this instrumental use of local state community safety architectures which were used 
to deploy highly focused coercive counter-terrorism initiatives, ultimately undermining the 
legitimacy of the former (see Birmingham City Council, 2010).  
Thus the population of particular territories, with a diversity of actors and coalitions and with 
different logics of security-driven resilience, does not necessarily translate into a coherent 
approach on the ground given the very different uses made of high-tech surveillance for anti-
crime and counter-terrorism purposes. In this sense, heterogeneous elements remain diverse 
and diverse logics abrade even when drawn into tentative coalition.  
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Project Champion was also detached from other community-focused policing and local 
authority approaches to security-driven resilience being undertaken in the area. In particular, 
WMP had established a dedicated department within its Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) to 
focus on developing successful partnerships with a range of local civil society organizations 
and institutions in order to drive forward the Prevent agenda. For example, dedicated 
‘Security and Partnerships Officers’ were working across key neighbourhoods – in schools, 
mosques, community centres, and sports clubs – to encourage community-wide action to 
defeat violent extremism. However, this has proved to be a problematic relationship to 
maintain, with a subsequent Institute of Race Relations report (Kundnani, 2009) noting that a 
parliamentary committee meeting (House of Commons, 2010) regarded the ‘embedding’ of 
counter-terrorism police in local services as a major cause for concern for Muslim 
communities.  
 
The events relating to this initial phase of Project Champion highlight a series of fissures 
amongst the approaches used in the delivery of a nationally important but locally focused 
security- driven resilience initiative, placing community approaches at odds with protective 
logics of security in a way that effectively stigmatized the area (Isakjee and Allen, 2013). 
Eventually this led, in response to a media outcry which, in the words of Beck (1995: 100), 
‘sounded the social alarm’, to significant resistance to the scheme from local residents amidst 
complaints that the intentions and sheer scale of the surveillance deployment had been 
masked. However, despite media representations pitching a Manichean conflict between 
those applying and those subjected to Project Champion’s cameras, initial resistance to the 
scheme emerged from those less directly targeted by their gaze.8  
Initial protests began in the more affluent neighbouring district of Moseley, where residents 
queried the installation of camera stanchions in their streets, feeling it diminished the 
aesthetic appeal of the area. Despite their status as public backers and legitimators of the 
scheme, representatives of the municipal Safer Birmingham Partnership attending a meeting 
of these residents had no knowledge of the location or extent to which counter-terrorism 
police had introduced the scheme (Safer Birmingham Partnership representative, 
interviewed March 2011, unpublished). In addition to being criticized by the public for the 
scheme, and excluded by the police from any prospect of using the promised integrated 
system for municipal ends, the origins of this disquiet signify a further difficulty. Here, it was 
affluent suburban social movements that managed to mobilize their grievances. Moreover, in 
addition to highlighting fractures between the local and central state, such events illustrate 
the limited extent of engagement with local communities under the third logic of security-
driven resilience.  
Local communities were outraged when Project Champion became public knowledge and, 
through community leaders, organized a series of public meeting to protest about the 
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initiative as well as to seek clarity as to where the covert cameras were actually sited. With 
the backdrop of large public meetings, tensions escalated and by June 2010 news of Project 
Champion reached the national media. As one local protestor noted:  
Now the truth is out, there’s a lot of anger. Certain communities have been ring-fenced and 
saturated with cameras, making it impossible for you to get in or out without being tracked. 
What’s happening here is the government is spying on its citizens covertly in some cases, 
without their knowledge or consent, and it’s a gross invasion of privacy and civil liberties. 
(BBC, 2010a)  
Surveillance had thus become a visible symbol of a pernicious expression of security-driven 
resilience. A formal public consultation was forced, which led to ‘hoods’ being placed over 
the visible ANPR cameras in July 2010 pending ‘further consultation’, although, as the BBC 
(2010b) noted at the time, the cameras were not being disabled and the hidden cameras 
were, in theory, still useable.  
The subsequent independent investigation and report by Thames Valley Police was highly 
critical of both the Project Champion scheme and WMP which, it claimed, had done 
irreparable harm to community–police relations. In the wake of this report the camera 
network was dismantled in mid-2011, during which time the police stated that the cameras 
had never actually been activated. Birmingham City Council also carried out its own review 
into the handling of Project Champion and concluded that the cameras should be removed. 
The legacy of the local Project Champion scheme was, however, destined to have national 
importance, with the hardware that was installed being redeployed in London and other 
areas of the UK in the policing of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (BBC, 2011). Fifty-
three of the cameras were eventually sold to other forces (for £1 each) to help with the wider 
Olympic security operations (Birmingham Mail, 2012). With the Games hosted in an urban 
area accommodating Western Europe’s most populous Muslim com- munities, former 
objections to the cameras were seemingly swept aside in face of the ephemeral and 
exceptional security demands of these major international sporting events (Fussey et al., 
2011). Another postscript to the Project Champion story reveals further the longevity of 
conflict and tensions accompanying the scheme. In the wake of convictions of a number of 
Sparkbrook residents for a failed suicide bomb plot in early 2013 which, if successful, would 
have killed more people than the 7/7 attacks in London, local parliamentarian Khalid 
Mahmood argued that the relaunch of Project Champion ‘could ensure the safety and 
security for people in Birmingham and the whole UK ... [the cameras] would have been a 
huge asset and it has been lost. I now want to see a replacement’ (Birmingham Mail, 2013). 
Thus, once competing narratives and logics of security-driven resilience are brought together 
they may be outlasted by the conflict they generate.  
Conclusions: Resilience and tensions of devolved state security logics  
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This article has traced the relationship between security and resilience policy, and practice in 
its development has led to the dominance of security concerns and the emergence of three 
distinct security-driven logics of resilience. The prominence of anticipatory and preventative 
approaches within these logics has served to draw security architectures – particularly those 
emphasizing modes of surveillance, observation and knowledge-gathering – into the practice 
of resilience. At the same time, the co-purposing of surveillance and other social control 
strategies towards both security and broader, more seemingly benign resilience practices 
enables their deployment under more palatable auspices. Through an analysis of the 
operationalization of these security-driven resilience logics with regard to one specific 
security scheme, Project Champion in Birmingham, the article has revealed a number of 
tensions within and between these logics that become animated as these practices become 
implemented. These include the remapping of scale on security; the shift in focus from 
protection towards local self-organization; the anticipatory turn in both crime control and 
national security; and the increasing array of security ‘actors’ who now have a responsibility 
for national security and counter-terrorism operations.  
Illuminated through the empirical study of Project Champion, the principal argument is that 
the modulations between different logics and scales of security-driven resilience exist in 
perpetual tension and thus do not necessarily translate into any coherent form of social 
control on the ground. Ultimately, such discordances reveal inherent antagonisms within 
resilience strategies that are reliant on coproduction and codelivery between the controller 
and those controlled. However, the importance of these frictions goes beyond incoherencies 
and tensions within broader assemblages of action, to reveal a range of processes concerning 
the governance and scaling of security-driven resilience practice. These are discussed in turn, 
as follows.  
Underpinned by the rise of resilience as the discourse of choice for new national security 
imperatives, this article has highlighted multiple and heterogeneous processes that lie behind 
policy rhetoric and which become spatially imprinted in local areas. The broader 
mainstreaming drivers of security-driven resilience practice and logic further agitate such 
tensions and frictions. As this article has argued, such drivers include the shifting governance 
of resilience practice and the de- institutionalizing of security.  
Separately, analysis of Project Champion also reveals a number of insights concerning the 
‘responsibilizing’ (Garland, 1996) of ever-increasing numbers of local, public-facing individuals 
and agencies into (security-driven) resilience roles. As Chandler (2012: 216) noted, the 
discourse of resilience has facilitated ‘a shift’ in dominant security discourse in terms of scale 
of intervention. Its policies encourage the development of community or institutional 
resilience and of the ‘responsible citizen’ in accordance with new techniques of 
governmentality: the replacement of state-centric ‘protective’ security approaches with 
those emphasizing ‘self-organizing’ human security. As recent work on resilient subjectivity in 
late modernity has also argued, resilience pol- icy appears to be part of ‘a complex of 
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scientifically grounded techniques of the self, necessary to optimize autonomous subject in 
an age of high uncertainty’ (O’Malley, 2010: 488). Such ‘optimization’ projects targeted at so-
called ‘neurotic citizens’ (Isin, 2004) are now widespread and seek to shift responsibility to 
general local level governing practices and non-government subjects.  
However, for all the focus on local and subjective individual performance of resilience 
functions (and their absorption of resilience failures), the persistence of state governance 
from a distance (Fussey, 2004; Joseph, 2013) enables multiple extant hierarchies and 
separations of tasks to remain and exert themselves. At the same time, the proliferation of 
resilience discourse has led to increasingly broad coalitions of practice and a cluttered 
organizational landscape. Moreover, new networks of practice have long been understood to 
generate new hierarchical arrangements (see, for example, Latour, 1988), a process also 
evident in this analysis of assembled coalitions of security-driven resilience and the primacy 
afforded to specific readings of security within these arrangements.  
In one sense it is worth recognizing not only the existence and inevitability of such scalings, 
but also their material and political consequences. Adey and Anderson (2011), for example, 
recognize how within emergency response activities such scaling may enable efficiency and 
accountability. However, the opacity of many security-driven resilience initiatives, the 
politicized nature of hierarchical relationships within resilience practice, and the specific 
politics that such arrangements produce mean such aspirations are not always easy to 
realize.  
In many ways, security-driven resilience, and its execution through surveillance practices, is 
increasingly normalized within modern society and has become a key mode of organizing 
contemporary neoliberal society. Logics of protection, reassurance, adaptation, preparedness 
and prevention can be identified; pre-managed risk, control and security, increasingly feeding 
into an ever-increasing range of national and local policy and practice. Resilience, emerging 
predominantly as a security-focused policy connected to countering the threat of 
international terrorism, is now fully embedded as a policy metaphor for envisioning future 
local place-making and community building activities alongside broader scale national 
security concerns.  
As we have highlighted, domestic security environments – generated and sustained though 
the lens of resilience – are heavily mediated by complex and often contradictory practices. In 
Birmingham, the resilience logics of territorial enclosure, where high-risk sites are fortified 
against exogenous threats, underwent a transposition towards the enclosure of endogenous 
‘risks’ within technological perimeters. These divisions are abundant and serve to underline 
the fragmented nature of security-driven resilience. As these develop, these contested 
outcomes, together with the security-focused practices that stimulate them, increasingly 
resemble the antithesis of long-understood principles and conditions of what makes 
something resilient. These include the accent on themes such as connectivity, coherency, 
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adaptation and flexibility that have been at the heart of discussions on resilience, and of what 
makes something resilient, over the last 40 years (see, for example, Holling, 1973). In doing 
so, the realization of complex, convoluted and contradictory security-driven resilience 
practices may mutate into practices that ultimately subvert some of the founding principles 
of resilience logic itself.  
Notes  
1. This Act came into force in November 2005. See also see UK Resilience website within the 
Cabinet Office (http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience) which pre-dated the CCA. 
The CCA aimed to establish ‘a modern framework for civil protection capable of meeting 
the challenges of the 21st century’ (Security Service, 2006).   
2. This strategy was developed from 2003 but only made public in 2006. Updated versions 
were released in 2009 and 2011.   
3. See also a revised version published in 2010 (Cabinet Office, 2010).   
4. See also updated 2011 version.   
5. In the UK this involves, for example, the Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI), the  National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and the 
Civil Contingencies Secretariat.   
6. In a series of coordinated attacks on London’s transport network on 7 July 2005, suicide 
bombers killed  52 and injured 770 people.   
7. Similarly, in the USA, Canada and Australia, for example, a core approach of localized 
counter vio-  lent extremism (CVE) strategies has been the attempted development of 
‘community resilience’ more  generally   
8. Resistance to Project Champion has been covered in greater detail elsewhere (see, for 
example, Fussey,  2013) and it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed 
exegesis of its development. Key points are relayed here to illustrate the tensions between 
scalings and logics of security-driven resilience practice.  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